(see below for Bigelow)
Fall 2001, Vol. 33, No. 3
The Diplomats Who Sank a Fleet:
The Confederacy's Undelivered European Fleet and the Union Consular Service
By Kevin J. Foster
© 2001 Kevin J. Foster
Thomas Haines Dudley, the U.S. consul in Liverpool, had grown desperate.
He
had failed to stop one Confederate raider, CSS Florida, from departing
Liverpool.
He had spent months gathering information about a second suspicious vessel,
reported to be a warship destined for the Confederates. Not knowing her
name,
Dudley referred to her by the hull number at the shipyard, No. 290. On
May 16,
1862, he reported the launch of the ship to Washington. A month later he
reported
the trial trip and the expected imminent departure of No. 290. Then Dudley
traveled to London to confer personally with Charles Francis Adams, U.S.
minister to the Court of St. James. Adams, recognizing the urgency, pressed
British Foreign Office Secretary Earl Russell to stop the ship. Russell
started the
ponderous wheels of government toward resolving the question of the
destination and legality of No. 290's building and departure. The British
government was on the case.
Dudley provided more information on July 5, including a full description
of the
ship's appearance along with the news that the construction was being overseen
by Capt. [sic] J. D. Bulloch of the Confederate States Navy. British government
officers could not act because the evidence was not in the proper form
and
depended upon anonymous informants. Consul Dudley consulted British
attorneys and opened direct communication with the collector of customs
in the
Port of Liverpool and other officials. They explained the requirements
of British
domestic law so that the evidence could be presented in acceptable forms.
Informants were persuaded to give notarized depositions. U.S. suspicions
were
presented in a logical, precisely legal form.1 By July 29 sufficient evidence
had
been presented for the law officers of the Crown to opine that "the vessel,
cargo,
and stores, may be properly condemned."2
The order to seize the ship was given—just too late. No. 290, for the moment
named Enrica, had sailed the day before. Shortly afterward, two supply
ships met
her in the Azores. She was armed and commissioned CSS Alabama. The raider
would go on to sink more U.S. merchant vessels than any other warship before
or since. Consul Dudley and Minister Adams had failed, but they had learned
valuable lessons.
During the American Civil War, 1861–1865, the Confederate States of America
created a modern naval force within a few years. More than sixty armored
vessels
were begun at home; dozens of gunboats were built, and many more river
and
commercial craft were modified and armed. A vital component in this military
buildup was the willingness of several European nations to sell arms,
equipment, and ships to the South. Despite neutrality laws intended to
prevent
the outfitting of belligerent expeditions and warships, the South enjoyed
considerable success in acquiring and arming vessels abroad. Southern efforts
did not, however, meet with universal success. The Confederates desired
far
more vessels than reached their hands. Some of these foreign-built vessels
were considered but not purchased; some were built on speculation for potential
sale to the South; others were ordered but not delivered. They included
ironclads,
cruising ships, gunboats, torpedo boats, blockade-runners, and supply ships.
Many factors kept the South from acquiring all of the ships that it was
offered—or
the vessels it most desired. Inexperienced diplomats, disorganization,
widespread European popular opposition to slavery, uncertain credit, weak
central economic planning, and competition from other ship buyers all prevented
ships from reaching Confederate hands. But the greatest cause of the overall
Confederate failure in Europe was the activity of the United States Department
of
State, particularly the consuls, a small group of dedicated government
employees working abroad.
Confederate ship acquisition developed haphazardly. The new national
government and individual states sent a bewildering variety of diplomatic,
purchasing, propaganda, and military agents to Europe. Often these agents
worked at crossed purposes, driving up prices, encouraging petty disputes,
and
damaging their creditability. This confusion caused difficulties with governments
and suppliers alike. Despite initial problems however, by the end of the
conflict,
many elements of a balanced modern fleet had been acquired, if not actually
delivered, to Confederate hands.
The Confederate naval officer in charge of acquisition in Europe was Comdr.
James Dunwoody Bulloch. He arrived in Liverpool, England, on June 3, 1861,
under orders to procure "six steam propellers" to act as commerce raiders.
One
million Confederate dollars had been appropriated for this activity, but
little of this
amount had arrived when Bulloch began his work. Despite financial handicaps
he worked quickly. With the assistance of an Anglo-Confederate banking
and
shipping company, Fraser, Trenholm & Company of Liverpool, Bulloch
contracted
for the ships that would become CSS Florida and CSS Alabama. They were
sailing vessels with auxiliary steam engines, a combination that allowed
them to
cruise widely for Northern merchant ships. These ships and others to follow
soon earned reputations as fearsome commerce destroyers.3
Bulloch's work set the pattern for most further ship purchasing by Confederates.
He had to exercise extreme care to avoid violating British domestic law
designed
to prevent the fitting out of military vessels and expeditions in British
territory. In
particular, the Foreign Enlistment Act forbade British subjects from "equipping,
furnishing, fitting out, or arming, of any ship or vessel, with intent
or in order that
such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service" of a belligerent.
Penalties
for violation included punishment of individuals and forfeiture of vessels.4
The
law failed, however, in requiring overwhelming legal proof rather than
mere
suspicion before a vessel could be seized. Once the problem was recognized,
the British government was reluctant to change the policy because it would
tend
to show culpability in allowing Florida and Alabama to escape.5
Bulloch used the loophole by contracting with ordinary British, and later
French
and Swedish, business houses for ships, acting on behalf of the Confederate
government. The vessels were designed as warships but left the building
yards
with no armament actually fitted. Once at sea under a British merchant
captain,
the prospective cruiser would be met by another vessel carrying the guns,
Confederate naval and marine officers, and a large crew. After transfer,
the
Confederate captain placed the ship under commission and recruited a crew
from among both ships' companies. This process avoided restrictions posed
by
existing British neutrality law by moving the actual outfitting outside
British
territory.6
Bulloch's careful purchasing system was challenged by Union diplomats.
They
recognized that the legal loophole could allow entire fleets of vessels
to be
purchased in Europe. United States Secretary of State William H. Seward
coordinated what was to become a worldwide effort aimed at hampering
Confederate efforts abroad. Seward sought to prevent recognition of the
rebel
South as a belligerent or as a nation and to prevent as far as possible
foreign
trade with the rebellious states. When it suited his purposes he threatened
neutrals in various ways. Seward carefully instructed U.S. ambassadors
about
the course he wished them to take. The ambassadors, particularly the brilliant
Charles Francis Adams, U.S. minister in Great Britain, ably communicated
the
views of the Union administration. Adams presented a case that the British
sale
of warships to the South was a warlike act against the United States. Seward
added veiled mention of the likelihood of Union privateers being unleashed
on
British ships trading with the rebellious states. Congressional debate
about such
a law strengthened his case. Adams clearly demanded decisive action to
prevent
the creation of any more Alabamas or Floridas in British shipyards. Adams
also
laid the groundwork for later claims against the British empire for damages
caused by the building, outfitting, and sale of ships to the Confederacy.7
A third branch of the Union State Department also worked aggressively to
halt or
hinder Confederate efforts by gathering intelligence about rebel efforts
abroad.
These were the United States consuls in various cities and seaports around
the
world. Consuls assisted trade and shipping, collecting fees for their services
and
submitting regular reports about everyday events as well as shipwrecks,
mutinies, and piracy. Many took on new duties in wartime, providing valuable
intelligence and other services useful to the Union. Consuls utilized a
range of
informants that included abolitionists, dockhand thugs, shipyard apprentices,
members of the clergy, watermen, dock masters, unemployed mariners, and
Lloyd's Register inspectors. Among the most valuable materials gathered
were
"intercepted letters and papers" given, purchased, and stolen by consuls
and
their agents. Consuls gathered and collated all sorts of information, including
their estimates of the value and trustworthiness of various sources of
information
in reports to Washington and to each other.8 They usually sent reports
containing
intelligence information back to Secretary Seward in Washington, who distributed
it where needed. Much of the resulting evidence of un-neutral acts was
passed
on to Minister Adams, who remonstrated with the British government, the
most
frequent offender.9
Seward's office gathered, collated, and transmitted the information to
the military.
Some navy commands, such as the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, printed
bulletins for distribution: a blockader off Charleston might know the name
and
description of a new blockade-runner before it could finish its voyage
across the
Atlantic. On rare occasions the information transmitted included plans,
a sketch,
or a photograph of a ship or of a notorious rebel officer.10 This consular
intelligence gathering system grew from the efforts of a few individuals,
working
out of their own pockets, into a government enterprise that employed dozens
of
agents and required tens of thousands of dollars to finance.11 The consuls
kept
up a constant barrage of sighting reports, affidavits, vessel descriptions,
repeated rumors, and supposition about Confederate activity abroad. While
most
of these ships did have Southern connections, many did not, and the British
government was constantly investigating reports of vessels that proved
to have
no Confederate connections.12
Communication
Timely communication of important intelligence was vital to the war effort.
Most
communication was by mail, traveling on scheduled steamship routes. This
method limited both Union and rebel communications severely, requiring
a
minimum of about three weeks for a reply across the Atlantic. Mail by steamer
allowed regular communication but limited the frequency of trans-Atlantic
messages from most points to about two or three times a week, each taking
over
a week to reach Washington via New York. The letters had then to be read,
copied, and passed on to the Navy Department and then to the relevant
blockading fleets. Letters to the Confederate leadership in Richmond took
longer,
going by British steamers by way of Halifax, Havana, Nassau, or Bermuda.
Some consular stations used the telegraph for important messages to speed
the
process. However, they might be intercepted or copied in route on commercial
telegraph services. Coded messages for sensitive information became
common. Still, despite its utility, the expense of telegraph communication
led the
State Department to severely limit its use.13 Consuls also sometimes
communicated directly with the Union navy when time was too short for
information to be transmitted through Washington. On several occasions
Samuel
Whiting, the consul in Nassau, sped communications by hiring a swift pilot
schooner to carry messages directly to the naval station at Key West.14
Despite
the utility of the method, his entreaties to the State Department failed
to produce a
despatch boat for his use. His successor, Seth C. Hawley, tried harder,
securing
an estimate for purchase and operation of a small pilot schooner to carry
despatches. His efforts were no more successful than his predecessor's,
and
the department never provided a despatch boat.15
The first success of the Union consular espionage system prevented a small
wooden steam gunboat from service with the South. Alexandra was built by
William C. Miller of Liverpool as a gift to the Confederacy from Fraser,
Trenholm &
Company. As such it would have joined a few other Confederate vessels built
as
contributions to the war effort by citizens and not part of the regular
procurement
program. Consul Thomas H. Dudley of Liverpool gathered information directly,
hired experienced legal counsel, and prepared a case based on his experience
of the British legal system gained while trying to prevent the sailing
of CSS
Florida and CSS Alabama. Minister Adams used Dudley's information to force
the British government to bring court proceedings that, while failing to
seize the
ship, ultimately so delayed Alexandra that the gunboat was never placed
in
service. The Alexandra case and its resulting newspaper coverage also brought
considerable attention to Confederate operations in Great Britain and to
the
inadequate British neutrality laws. This attention forced the government
to take
decisive action to enforce neutral behavior upon its citizens during later
crises:
policy prevailed over law. The loss of the gunboat did little real damage
to
Confederate plans, but the legal precedent and attention devoted to rebel
purchasing permanently hindered Southern procurement in Europe.16
The Confederate agent Bulloch extended his ambitions when he contracted
with
Birkenhead shipbuilders, Laird and Sons, to construct two turreted ironclad
rams.
Bulloch based the rams upon the ideas of Capt. Cowper Coles of the Royal
Navy,
an outspoken British ironclad designer. They were impressive ships displacing
1,423 tons (light) and were 224.5 feet long. Their iron hulls had ram bows
supporting two turrets carrying 220-pounder Armstrong guns; lighter guns
were
mounted on raised forecastles and quarterdecks. Bark sailing rigs gave
them
range; powerful twin-screw engines combined with ram bows gave them ability
to
fight the most imposing Union ships.17
But the intended use of the rams could not be hidden or misdirected. Due
to their
ram bows, the ships were dangerous weapons platforms even before guns were
mounted. In locations around Europe, Union consuls gathered depositions
and
other evidence sufficient to prove the rams' connection with the Confederate
government. The persistent Liverpool consul, Thomas Haines Dudley, dogged
Bulloch, employing private detectives, sympathetic sea captains, knowledgeable
attorneys, and Confederate turncoats. He obtained copies of Confederate
correspondence and internal Laird documents to gain knowledge of Bulloch's
every move. The London consul, Freeman H. Morse, managed to induce a young
London mechanic to get a job in the Laird shipyards with a promise of a
recommendation to a U.S. shipbuilder. (The boy's mother found out and stopped
the spying by threatening to expose him and the U.S. government's role
in his
activities.) In London, at the Court of St. James, Minister Adams once
again ably
presented Dudley's evidence and explained the U.S. government's view that
release of the ironclad rams might be considered an act of war.18
From Washington, Secretary Seward coordinated the action by mail and
telegraph to stop the rams' delivery. Both rams were seized before completion
to
prevent them from slipping out of the country. Even a last-minute sham
sale,
ostensibly to a French company for delivery to Egypt, failed to free the
two ships
for the south. Caught in an awkward gap between domestic law and foreign
policy, the British Crown ultimately bought the Laird rams and commissioned
them HMS Scorpion and HMS Wivern. Brilliant cooperation between the three
main branches of the State Department had prevented two dangerous warships
from reaching the Confederate navy.19
The British difficulty in maintaining strict neutrality had its roots in
a conflict
between two principles of law. Under the precepts of international law,
neutral
Great Britain had an obligation to prevent the building and outfitting
of armed
warships for any belligerent in its ports. The critical point was that
the wording of
the law and accepted international practice to that time prohibited sales
of armed
vessels only. The tenet of domestic law that held that a defendant is "innocent
until proven guilty" allowed secretly built Confederate cruisers to be
dispatched
from British ports because positive proof of the cruiser's destination
was nearly
impossible to ascertain and arming took place outside British jurisdiction.
Following the commissioning of Florida and Alabama, Great Britain was forced
to prevent the departure of other vessels merely on justifiable suspicion
that they
were violating British domestic law.20
Bulloch was disappointed by the loss of the Laird rams but had already
expanded his operations beyond Great Britain. Negotiations with the French
government produced a conditional agreement to provide four modern wood
and
iron composite steam clipper corvettes for long-distance cruising. These
screw
corvettes would have been the equal of any U.S. Navy cruisers. Further
negotiations allowed contracts for two more powerful ironclad rams. These
shallow-draft ironclad wooden ships were designed with a brig sailing rig
and
twin-screw steam auxiliary propulsion. With the screw corvettes they could
present a dangerous challenge to the Union navy on the high seas, potentially
capable of overwhelming smaller squadrons on individual blockading
stations.21
All six ships were contracted through Lucien Arman, a shipbuilder with
a seat in
the French legislature and strong political connections to the Emperor
Louis
Napoleon III. They were built in the yards of Arman in Bordeaux and, through
engine-builder and fellow legislator M. Voruz, at the yards of Jollett
& Babin and
Dubigeon Brothers in Nantes. The sale was understood to have been approved
by the emperor and permitted by the minister of the navy. The ostensible
purpose
was to start a steam packet line between San Francisco and Japan and China.
The armament was said to enable them to fight off pirate attacks in eastern
waters and to allow potential sale to the Japanese or Chinese governments.22
But
Consul General John Bigelow in Paris had been preparing to ward off
any
shipbuilding efforts for the Confederacy in France. He had gathered rumors
and
credited reports from other consuls that Southern agents had contacted
French
shipbuilders. But Bigelow had not expected the intelligence windfall that
walked
into his consular office on September 10, 1863. The man, a disloyal senior
shipyard employee named Trémont, offered proof in the form of incriminating
documents and assurance that his information would be sufficient to force
the
arrest of the ships under French law. Called "Mr. X" by Bigelow, Trémont
asked
for twenty thousand francs, a considerable sum of money, if his material
should
stop the ships from reaching the Confederates. Trémont delivered
twenty-one
documents that proved not only that the contract was for the Confederate
navy but
that it was approved by the French government.23
Bigelow acted quickly. He delivered the documents to U.S. Minister to France
William L. Dayton. Dayton and Seward used the same approach taken with
Great
Britain, namely to present as full a public case as possible proving un-neutral
behavior. They also subtly threatened the French adventure to install Maximilian
as ruler of Mexico and to delay the lucrative French government tobacco
shipment
from Virginia. French Foreign Affairs Minister Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys
perceived
the threat, and the danger of growing Northern sentiment against France,
and
acted to force his emperor and country back toward a neutral posture. He
forced
the shipbuilders to sell all six vessels to governments then at peace.
Two
corvettes were sold to Peru; two corvettes and a ram were sold to Prussia;
and
one ram was sold to Sweden, or so the French government believed. The wily
Arman had sold the ironclad to a Swedish banker, who was to sell it to
Denmark.
But when the Danes refused the ship, Arman was able to sell it back to
the
Confederacy. It was delayed so much by storms and an unwilling crew that
the
ironclad, commissioned CSS Stonewall, never played a part in the war.24
Reports on every likely foreign shipbuilding contract were diligently transmitted
to
Washington. But by mid-1862, several of the most active consuls had spent
small fortunes to pay informers and spies—without reimbursement by the
government—and could do no more. Consul M. M. Jackson in Halifax, Nova
Scotia, had used his personal funds to hire others to assist him in his
intelligence gathering. When funding requirements for intelligence gathering
increased beyond his personal means, Jackson sought reimbursement for his
expenses in supporting this work. On December 9, 1863, he wrote Secretary
Seward:
I have found it necessary to employ persons at different times to procure
information in relation to vessels engaged in running the blockade of the
Southern ports. The Information thus offered has materially aided my own
efforts and investigations and enabled me to communicate to the
Department of State facts which have led to several important captures.25
Consul John Young in Belfast wrote:
I respectfully suggest that these times require a little outlay not provided
for by law—If we were authorized occasionally to employ a private
observer at our discretion the outlay would not be much and the benefit
might be considerable. From the general public we can learn little, the
sympathy seems to be sadly wasted on an accursedly bad cause.26
When he was unsuccessful, Young wrote Seward again the next year:
The only possible plan of knowing what may be going on here would be to
pay a secret agent. About (Lb) per annum would do this but you are aware
that I have no such fund at my disposal. I think however that I ought to
have such a fund and that it would pay itself fifty times over.27
The State Department found a way to meet the need by establishing a budget
for
secret service work by certain consuls. For instance, William T. Minor,
the Federal
consul in Havana, Cuba, paid several spies and informers to gather intelligence
on Confederate activities. A special account, the "secret service fund,"
was used
to pay for these activities. As an example of the high rate of pay enjoyed
by spies,
in December 1864 Minor paid three hundred dollars in gold to S. B. Haynes
for
his services during the past month.28
The Confederates also ordered two groups of steam-powered spar torpedo
boats from Great Britain. These included six iron twin-screw torpedo boats
built in
London and six more large steel torpedo boats built in Liverpool. The London
torpedo boats were lightly armored and capable of partial submersion to
lower
their silhouette. No records have been located documenting the arrival
of these
vessels in Southern ports, but at least one of the boats was tested on
the
Thames, and three others were mentioned leaving Great Britain as deck cargo
on blockade-runners. Union consuls reported these vessels to Washington
and
to Ambassador Adams, but they were apparently thought too minor to deserve
specific complaint from the Union government. Warnings were passed to the
Union navy to be on the lookout for the blockade-runners carrying these
boats as
deck cargo.29
Bulloch was not the only Confederate naval purchasing agent to seek ships
in
Europe. Another officer, Lt. James H. North, was dispatched to Europe at
the
same time as Bulloch with a similar mission. North was sent to France with
the
vain hope of purchasing or borrowing one of the armored frigates of the
Gloire
class, the most imposing ironclads built for the French navy. Should that
prove
impossible, he was to order the building of "one or two war steamers of
the most
modern and improved description." While his French visit was a bust, ultimately
North oversaw the building of the largest Confederate ship laid down during
the
war. He contracted with James and George Thomson of Glasgow to build a
large
ironclad frigate. She was to be 270 feet long, carry twenty 60-pounder
rifles and
eight 18-pounder smooth bores. Five hundred men would be required to crew
the
mammoth vessel. Union observers easily connected North's ship with the
South,
and she was sold at a loss to Denmark to prevent seizure.30
Another Confederate agent, George Terry Sinclair, contracted with Thomsons'
shipyard to build a composite iron- and wood-hulled steam auxiliary cruiser.
She
was reportedly built on the model of the Alabama but lengthened and improved.
Named Canton while building, this ship was renamed Pampero when launched.
The sale was concealed by use of a British subject, shipowner Edward
Pembroke of London, who ordered the ship through Glasgow brokers Patrick
Henderson and Company. Consul Underwood, with help from Liverpool consul
Dudley, obtained damning evidence against the ship. British government
actions
following the court decision in the Alexandra case prevented delivery,
and the
ship languished in Glasgow.31
Due to his unique position in public life, another Confederate agent, the
famous
oceanographer Matthew Fontaine Maury, operated in areas too rarified for
Bulloch. While touring Europe, meeting the aristocracy, and receiving awards
and
honors, Maury was pursuing a hidden agenda of purchasing warships and
perfecting a system of submarine mines for Southern harbor defense. He
was
aided by a network of friends, relatives, and sympathetic associates. One
of
these was Capt. Marin Jansen, Royal Netherlands Navy, who searched most
of
the prominent shipyards in Great Britain and France for potential cruisers,
ironclads, and gunboats.
The first vessel Jansen found was Japan, an iron brig-rigged propeller
built on
speculation by William Denny and Sons of Scotland. The ship became CSS
Georgia and took nine prizes during a short cruise. With her iron hull
foul, and in
need of repair, she put into Cherbourg on October 28, 1863. Decommissioned
as unfit for a cruiser, Georgia was sold June 1, 1864, for commercial service.32
Another Maury purchase was the second-class screw sloop HMS Victor, built
in
1857, which had been declared "defective and worn out beyond economic repair."
After some repairs, the sloop was renamed Scylla and slipped to sea. Once
outfitted, she became CSS Rappahannock and put into Calais, France, for
further
repairs. There the ship was detained and prevented from receiving repairs
or
from recruiting a full crew, which would have blatantly violated French
neutrality.
Rappahannock continued in Confederate hands, rotting at dock until the
end of
the war.33
The grandest purchase contemplated by M. F. Maury was a twin-screw, twin-turret
ironclad. Maury made arrangements through Jansen with Lucien Arman to build
the ironclad at his Bordeaux shipyard. Maury specified that the ship was
to have
sufficient seaworthiness to cross the Atlantic, a high spread of canvas,
less than
fifteen feet draft, and a speed of fifteen or sixteen knots. Confederate
efforts
aimed at diplomatic recognition and obtaining a European loan delayed and
ultimately doomed this project. Confederate diplomat John Slidell stipulated
that
the South could only undertake to order these expensive ships in French
shipyards if they would be openly built for the South. Napoleon III did
not agree to
the stipulation, and the ship was sacrificed to diplomatic expediency and
not
built.34
Another raider project was the result of a secret Confederate congressional
act
that created a "volunteer navy" to provide privateer-like commissions to
individuals and private vessels built at no cost to the government. The
first such
company formed, the Virginia Volunteer Navy Company, became the only
company to purchase a vessel under the new act. They bought the auxiliary
steamship Hawk, which had been built on speculation for sale by Henderson
and Colborne of Renfrew, Scotland. Hawk was strongly built of iron, 230
feet long
overall, with a lifting screw propeller and bark rig. After the purchase,
the steamer
was altered considerably to adapt her into a warship. The alterations and
its
owner, Thomas Sterling Begbie, a known blockade-runner owner, excited the
interest of Union agents. They, however, did not provide enough information
to
justify seizure. Hawk sailed to Bermuda, where the company proved unable
to
carry their project forward, and she returned to Liverpool unarmed.
Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to purchase finished ships involved
the
eight vessels of the Anglo-Chinese fleet built in Great Britain for China.
These
warships, called the Lay-Osborne flotilla for the leaders of the enterprise,
were
not accepted by the emperor of China after arriving in Chinese waters.
Half of the
fleet returned to Great Britain. Several others put into Bombay, where
they were
held until arrangements could be finalized for their sale and the payment
of the
crews.35
There is little surviving direct evidence to connect the Lay-Osborne
Anglo-Chinese fleet to the Confederacy. Circumstantial evidence supports
that
such a purchase was contemplated. CSS Alabama had shadowed the voyage of
several ships of the flotilla from South Africa to the Strait of Malacca.
The officers
of Alabama and the flagship Kwang-Tung had even exchanged social visits
in
Simon's Bay, South Africa. A senior captain of the fleet had been a ship
captain
for Fraser, Trenholm & Company, the principal government business agents
for
the Confederacy in Europe. After the Indian government seized the ships,
he
returned to London and left immediately in command of the large new
blockade-runner Lady Stirling. Despite the lack of contemporary evidence,
the
prospect of the entire mercenary fleet being sold to the Confederates led
to swift
action from the American diplomatic services. The British and Indian colonial
governments seized the ships to prevent them from being transferred to
the rebel
navy. Only after the Civil War was over did the British government learn
that
Confederate agents had been in place in Shanghai and Bombay and that the
sale might indeed have been completed. In any case, the Alabama returned
to
European waters alone.36
The last completed delivery to the Confederacy of a warship was another
product
of Bulloch's attention to detail. The steam clipper Sea King had been built
on the
Clyde River in Scotland as a speculation intended for long-distance commerce.
Her appearance attracted the attention of Union agents, but on completion
Sea
King was chartered by the British government to carry troops to New Zealand.
Bulloch got word when she returned and traveled to see the ship. Bulloch
bought
the clipper and once again armed and commissioned a cruiser at sea.
Commissioned CSS Shenandoah, the new cruiser worked her way from the
Atlantic into the Indian Ocean, refitted in Australia, and cut a swath
through the
Yankee whaling fleets in the Pacific. Off Alaska, Shenandoah learned in
late June
1865 of the defeat of all other Confederate forces and the imprisonment
of the
Confederate leaders. The armament was dismantled and sent below decks.
Shenandoah sailed around the world to Liverpool, where she was turned over
on
November 5, 1865, to the British government for return to the United States,
the
last intact Confederate military unit.37
The
Diplomats Who Sank a Fleet, Part 2
23. John Bigelow, France and the Confederate Navy
(1888), pp. 1–15.
< rodbigelow@netzero.net
> 
